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Introduction
Economist Joseph Schumpeter famously argued that change occurs
through a process of creative destruction.1 Competitors innovate new
ways of doing things, which ushers in a new world to which competitors
must adapt, sparking further rounds of innovation and adaptation. The
law is no less subject to these processes than business, as recent
developments in shareholder litigation show.
State corporate law governs the relationship between shareholders
and boards of directors and confers upon shareholders the right to sue
directors for breaches of fiduciary duty.2 Most powerful among these,
†

T.J. Maloney Chair and Professor of Law, Fordham University School of
Law. This Article benefited from comments received at the 2018 Leet
Symposium at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks
to Joe Grundfest and Anthony Rickey for comments and conversations
on earlier drafts. For superlative research assistance, thanks to Julian
Constain (FLS 2020). The viewpoints and any errors expressed herein are
mine alone.

1.

Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 82–
83 (2d ed. 1947).

2.

Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and
Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 Del. J. Corp.
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at least historically, is the fiduciary duty cause of action available to
shareholders when the company they own is merged with or acquired
by another company.3 In merger litigation, shareholders can sue the
board of directors for following a flawed sale process4 or for failing to
disclose adequate information prior to the shareholder vote on the
transaction.5 For many years, approximately one-third to one-half of all
merger deals valued over $100 million attracted such claims. Then
suddenly, in 2009, the proportion of transactions attracting merger
L. 673, 675–76 (2005) (“The central idea of Delaware’s approach to
corporate law is the social utility of an active, engaged central
management. That idea is expressed by our statute, which states the
fundamental principle that the ‘business and affairs of the corporation are
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.’” (quoting Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2018))).
3.

Id. at 676. Shareholders can sue their directors for a breach of the duty of
either care or loyalty. Application of the business judgment rule, however,
assures that they will typically lose these cases. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
Vand. L. Rev. 83, 88–89 (2004) (“The [business judgment rule
creates] . . . a presumption that the directors or officers ‘of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action was in the best interests of the company.’” (quoting Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812) (Del. 1984)). Mergers and acquisitions cases,
however, often receive a heightened level of judicial scrutiny. See J. Travis
Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It
Means, 19 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 5, 6 (2013) (discussing Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
and how it changed the extent of judicial deference given to the board’s
decisions regarding mergers and acquisitions). For brevity, I will refer to
merger and acquisition claims collectively as “merger litigation.”

4.

See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). Mergers
involving a controlling shareholder may be reviewed under the exacting
“entire fairness” standard. Id. at 710–11 (requiring fair dealing and fair
price in non-arm’s length transactions). However, a board’s adoption of
procedural protections, such as special committees and majority of the
minority vote requirements, may be deployed in such transactions to shift
the standard to the deferential business judgment rule. Kahn v. M&F
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). Meanwhile, third-party
mergers may be reviewed under the standard of “enhanced scrutiny.”
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
However, in a claim for damages, an “uncoerced, informed stockholder
vote” will shift the standard to the business judgment rule. Corwin v.
KKR Fin. Holdings, 125 A.3d 304, 308–09 (Del. 2015). Furthermore, a
claim for injunctive relief will likely not succeed in the absence of an
intervening bidder. C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’
and Sanitation Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1066–67 (Del. 2014).

5.

See, e.g., Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992) (“[D]irectors of
Delaware corporations are under a fiduciary duty to disclose fully and
fairly all material information within the board’s control when it seeks
shareholder action.”).
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litigation jumped from about half to approximately 85 percent.6 The
higher number became the new normal. In each year from 2009 until
2016, somewhere between 85 and 95 percent of all deals attracted
litigation.7
What happened in 2009 that generated this spike in merger
litigation? A respected practitioner once explained it to me as a function
of a policy change at public relations firms. According to him, in 2009
the two top public relations firms began accepting press releases from
law firms announcing “investigations” of board conduct in connection
with corporate transactions. Once a deal was announced, plaintiffs’
firms could immediately announce an investigation of the board.
Inevitably these announcements linked to the plaintiffs’ website and
suggested that anyone holding stock in the target company contact the
law firm for further information on the investigation. Packaged as press
releases, these announcements were then picked up by websites, such
as Yahoo Finance. As a result, shareholders looking up news of a merger
announcement or simply tracking their investments would find, on the
same web page, the announcement of an investigation into board
misconduct in connection with the transaction. The announcements
were, of course, a veiled form of attorney advertising for those lawyers
specializing in disclosure-based claims (the “disclosure bar”).8 Anyone
6.

Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The
Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 Iowa L. Rev. 465,
475 (2015).

7.

See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in
2015, at 2 (Berkeley Ctr. for L., Bus. & Econ., Working Paper, 2017),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [https://perma.cc/S662-S3BH] (providing
empirical evidence of litigation activity and outcomes).

8.

On the division of the plaintiffs’ bar into two on the basis of those who
bring disclosure-based claims and those who do not, see Joel Edan
Friedlander, How Rural/Metro Exposed the Systemic Problem of
Disclosure Settlements, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 877, 904–05 (2016). In
Friedlander’s words:
The widespread availability of disclosure settlements led to the
creation of a two-tier stockholder-plaintiff bar with very different
approaches to litigating the same type of case. One tier of firms
has adopted a business model of entering into disclosure
settlements and thereby collecting risk-free fee awards near the
outset of a case. These firms released Revlon claims after a
purported investigation of their viability, even though they had
no demonstrated track record of pursuing Revlon claims for
significant monetary relief. Another tier of firms did not present
disclosure settlements to the Court of Chancery, and instead
litigated preliminary injunction motions and sought damages on
Revlon claims. In an unknown number of cases, firms in the
disclosure settlement bar released valuable Revlon claims.
Id. at 882; see also Sean J. Griffith & Anthony Rickey, Who Collects the
Deal Tax, Where, and What Delaware Can Do About It, in Research
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who contacted the law firm was a potential plaintiff who might be
willing to let the firm file a suit in their name against the target
company. Thus, announcing the “investigation” as a press release
became the key to finding a plaintiff. The policy change at the public
relations firms enabled the disclosure bar to find a shareholder in, and
thus to file a claim against, every deal.
That story may be apocryphal. But at its core is a truth about
innovation. It begins with an outside shock that leads to adaptation
and, in the view of many, destruction.9 Delaware responded to the
development with a 2016 decision of the Court of Chancery, In re
Trulia,10 which made disclosure-based merger claims harder to settle.11
Handbook On Representative Shareholder Litigation 140 (Sean
Griffith et al. ed., 2018) (noting that the distinction between the disclosure
bar and the non-disclosure bar is sometimes porous).
9.

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Entrepreneurial Litigation: Its Rise and
Fall and Future 90 (2015) (noting that in the context of merger class
actions, “incentives to sue have become excessive, and litigation is growing
out of control, like algae in a petri dish”); see also Stephen Bainbridge,
Fee-Shifting: Delaware’s Self-Inflicted Wound, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 851,
852 (2016) (contending that merger litigation is a “problem [that] has
reached crisis proportions”); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas,
Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers in a World with Weak
Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 19, 27 (2016) (noting that
“litigation against publicly-held companies that undertake deals is now of
epidemic proportions”); Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the Peppercorn
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal
for Reform, 93 Tex. L. Rev. 557, 558–59 (2015) (noting that “[d]eal
litigation is pervasive in the United States” and providing statistics);
Friedlander, supra note 8, at 883 (“The institutionalization of routine
disclosure settlements parodied the procedures for adjudicating claims of
breach of fiduciary duty.”); Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate
Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on
Fees, 56 B.C. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2015) (“The defects of shareholder litigation
have long been known.”); Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The
Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 Ohio
St. L.J. 829, 841 (2014) (emphasizing indicia of litigation agency costs in
merger class actions and arguing that the merits count for little in such
claims); Brian JM Quinn, Shareholder Lawsuits, Status Quo Bias, and
Adoption of the Exclusive Forum Provision, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 137,
155 (2011) (discussing merger lawsuits as “cookie-cutter complaints”);
David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An
Empirical Assessment of Institutional Lead Plaintiffs in Transactional
Class and Derivative Actions, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 907, 909 (2014) (“The
debate over transactional class and derivative actions continues to rage
both inside and outside academia.”).

10.

In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). I filed
an amicus curiae brief in the Trulia case. See Brief for Sean J. Griffith as
Amicus Curiae, In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del.
Ch. 2016) (No. 100020-CB), 2015 WL 6391945.

11.

Trulia, 129 A.3d at 886–87.
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But the story did not end there. It is not so easy to halt the process of
creative destruction. Trulia only spurred the disclosure bar to further
innovation.
This Article treats Trulia as a beginning, rather than an end. It
shows that the case has spurred the disclosure bar to innovate in order
to protect their fees. These innovations have taken the form of both
process innovations and product innovations. The disclosure bar’s first
step after Trulia was to seek an alternative forum, bringing disclosure
claims in states other than Delaware and in federal courts.12 This is a
process innovation. Soon, however, the disclosure bar began to change
the nature of the claims themselves—seeking “mootness fees” instead
of “disclosure settlements” and ultimately widening the scope of
possible disclosure-based claims.13 This is a product innovation, a
change in the nature of the product itself. This Article examines both
forms of innovation in shareholder suits post-Trulia. The consistent
theme throughout is that so long as the holdup value of litigation
exceeds the cost of bringing a lawsuit, meritless claims will persist as
the disclosure bar innovates to its advantage.
From this introduction, the Article proceeds as follows: Part I
introduces the crisis in shareholder litigation created by the
proliferation of disclosure-based claims and the response of the
Delaware Court of Chancery in Trulia. Part II follows the movement
of disclosure-based claims to other state courts in the wake of that case.
Part III discusses the transformation of disclosure settlements into
disclosure-based mootness fees. Part IV describes the further migration
of disclosure claims into federal court and, once there, their mutation
into alternative forms of disclosure-based claims.14 Part V analyzes why
the defense bar has lagged behind the disclosure bar in innovation and
suggests that the best way for defendants to solve the problem is by
credibly committing not to pay the disclosure bar’s fees, ultimately
arguing that the proliferation of meritless, disclosure-based claims will
end only when the holdup value of such claims is lower than the cost
of pursuing them.

12.

Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 Vand.
L. Rev. 603, 608, 615 (2018).

13.

Trulia, 129 A.3d at 897 (distinguishing the settlement path from the
mootness path).

14.

I was involved in many of the cases I discuss in Parts I–IV, either as an
expert, an amicus, or an objector. I received no financial compensation
from any of these cases and participated only to provide courts with
information that they might otherwise not receive, given the nonadversarial nature of settlement hearings. See infra note 21 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, I have disclosed any such involvement
in the footnotes herein.
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I.

Trulia Triggers Innovation

The crisis in shareholder litigation that began in 2009 was evident
not only in the frequency with which merger claims were brought but
also in the way in which those claims were typically resolved.15 Merger
litigation was brought in almost every deal, and most merger claims
settled.16 However, the vast majority of these settlements provided no
monetary recovery to the plaintiff class.17 Instead, merger claims
typically resulted in supplemental disclosures—so called, “disclosure
settlements”—that became the basis of the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fee
award.18 Defense attorneys insisted that the release bind all shareholders
as a class and that it contain a broad release of any and all related
claims.19
Because these claims were settled on a class basis, courts had to
approve the fairness of the settlement.20 At fairness hearings, judges are
15.

Dan Awrey et al., Resolving the Crisis in U.S. Merger Regulation: A
Transatlantic Alternative to the Perpetual Litigation Machine, 35 Yale
J. Reg. 1, 12 (2018) (“[T]he core problem is that merger litigation . . . has
devolved into a non-adversarial process in which attorneys on both
sides . . . extract rents from corporations and their shareholders”).

16.

Approximately 70 percent of merger cases settle, while the rest are
dismissed. Cornerstone Research in Cooperation with Robert
Daines, Recent Developments in Shareholder Litigation
Involving Mergers and Acquisitions 8 (2012), http://www.
cornerstone.com/files/upload/Shareholder_MandA_Litigation.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3932-WHGT] [hereinafter Developments in Shareholder
Litigation] (finding that 69 percent of the 565 suits for which the authors
could track the resolution resulted in settlement, while 27 percent were
voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs, and 4 percent were dismissed with
prejudice); Cain & Solomon, supra note 6, at 477 (“[L]itigation with
respect to transactions is dismissed by the court 28.4% of the time. The
other 71.6% of transaction litigations result in some type of settlement.”).

17.

Developments in Shareholder Litigation, supra note 16, at 10
(reporting that less than 5 percent out of 190 settlements sampled resulted
in payments to shareholders, while 82 percent resulted in disclosure-based
settlements); Cain & Solomon, supra note 6, at 478 (“Settlements which
only require disclosure constitute 55.1% of the settlement types in the
sample and are the most common type of settlement.”).

18.

Griffith, supra note 9, at 15. Claims were brought merely to conclude
settlements which were valuable solely as a basis for fees. Claims were
brought merely to conclude settlements which were valuable solely as a
basis for fees.

19.

Id. at 16–18.

20.

See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 951, 968–69 (2014) (“What binds the class is not
the agreement between the defendant and the lead plaintiffs or class
counsel, but rather the court’s judgment approving that agreement. The
binding effect of a class settlement, in other words, must be understood
as a function of judicial power.”); William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness
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ordinarily uninformed about the low value of the settlement disclosures,
and the former adversaries work together to keep them that way so
that they will approve their settlement agreement.21 However, the
Delaware Court of Chancery had seen enough such cases to worry that
meaningful shareholder rights were imperiled by such practices.22 By

Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. Rev.
1435, 1444 (2006) (“If class action attorneys sell out their clients, the
judge should perceive that the settlement does not live up to the value of
the claims and reject it accordingly. Conversely, if class action attorneys
file a frivolous case, the judge should perceive that the settlement is
merely a nuisance payment, reject it for that reason, and dismiss the
case.”).
21.

See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1082
(1984) (“The contending parties have struck a bargain and have every
interest in defending the settlement and in convincing the judge that it is
in accord with the law.”). Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 46 (1991) (describing settlement hearings as “pep rallies jointly
orchestrated by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel”).

22.

See, e.g., In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 6350-VCL,
slip op. at 2, 95 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2014) (settling claim for a $91.3 million
payment to the stockholder class in spite of having been first presented
as a disclosure settlement). Delaware judges rejected disclosure
settlements sua sponte in a number of cases. See, e.g., In re Transatlantic
Holdings Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6574-CS, slip op. at 8–11 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 8, 2013) (refusing to approve settlement for lack of “any real
investigation,” disclosure of additional background information and in
light of the overwhelming vote in favor of the transaction); In re Medicis
Pharm. Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 7857-CS, slip op. at 24 (Del. Ch. Apr.
4, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and noting that “giving out
releases lightly . . . is something we’ve got to be careful about”); Rubin v.
Obagi Med. Prods., Inc., No. 8433-VCL, slip op. at 8, 10 (Del. Ch. Apr.
30, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and noting that “there are
unknown unknowns in the world, and the type of global release . . . in
this case and . . . [similar] disclosure settlements provides expansive
protection for the defendants against a broad range of claims, virtually all
of which have been completely unexplored by plaintiffs”); In re
Theragenics Corp. Stockholders Litig., No. 8790-VCL, slip op. at 69–70
(Del. Ch. May 23, 2014) (refusing to approve settlement and noting that
“when a fiduciary action settles, I have to have some confidence that the
issues in the case were adequately explored, particularly when there is
going to be a global, expansive, all-encompassing release given.”); Acevedo
v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730–VCL, slip op. at 73, 79 (Del. Ch.
July 8, 2015) (rejecting a disclosure-only settlement where plaintiffs
settled for “precisely the type of nonsubstantive disclosures that routinely
show up in these types of settlements”); In re Aruba Networks, Inc.
Stockholder Litig., No. 10765-VCL, slip op. at 73 (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015)
(denying settlement approval and emphasizing that representation is
inadequate where counsel files litigation when “there wasn’t a basis to file
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the end of 2015, that court had made it clear that it was considering
change.23 In January 2016, change finally came with Trulia.
In Trulia, Chancellor Bouchard reaffirmed longstanding Delaware
precedent that a supplemental disclosure offered in settlement is an
adequate basis for a fee award only if it provides a material benefit to
the shareholder class.24 In Delaware, as in federal law, information is
material only “if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”25 Lest
there be any doubt that Delaware judges would no longer rubber stamp
disclosure settlements, the Chancellor wrote:
[P]ractitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are likely
to be met with continued disfavor in the future unless the
supplemental
disclosures
address
a
plainly
material
misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the
proposed release is narrowly circumscribed to encompass nothing
more than disclosure claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning
the sale process, if the record shows that such claims have been
investigated sufficiently. In using the term “plainly material,” I
mean that it should not be a close call that the supplemental
information is material as that term is defined under Delaware
law.26

In applying a high standard of materiality as a condition for the
approval of disclosure settlements, Trulia announced that such
settlements would no longer be welcome in Delaware. The disclosure
bar would have to take their meritless settlements somewhere else. And
so they did.
in the first place” but subsequently fails to aggressively litigate when
discovery turns up valuable information).
23.

See In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015
Del. Ch. LEXIS 241, at *21 (Del. Ch. Sept. 17, 2015) (approving
settlement but noting that “[i]f it were not for the reasonable reliance of
the parties on formerly settled practice in this Court . . . the interests of
the Class might merit rejection of a settlement encompassing a release
that goes far beyond the claims asserted and the results achieved”).

24.

See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898–99 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 22, 2016) (citing Hoffman v. Dann, 205 A.2d 343, 345 (Del. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 973 (1965)); see also Chrysler Corp. v. Dann, 223
A.2d 384 (Del. 1966).

25.

Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (adopting
standard of TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). Said
differently, information is material if, from the perspective of a reasonable
stockholder, there is a substantial likelihood that it “significantly alter[s]
the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav.
Bancorp., 650 A.2d 1270, 1277 (Del. 1994).

26.

Trulia, 129 A.3d at 898 (citation omitted).
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II. Process Innovation: Merger Claims in Other
States
Merger claims can be brought in three places: in the state of
incorporation, in the headquarters state, or in federal court.27 When a
company’s headquarters state is different from its state of
incorporation, as is almost always the case for companies incorporated
in Delaware, the complaint can be heard in up to three different courts.
An early process innovation in the wake of Trulia was, therefore, to
bring the claim and seek approval of the settlement in an alternative
forum. This was an incremental innovation. A willingness to file merger
claims outside of Delaware preceded Trulia.28 Nevertheless, the Court
of Chancery’s apparent hostility to disclosure settlements led to a flood
of merger litigation in other states after Trulia.29
An obvious question raised by merger claims brought in other states
is whether Trulia applies outside of Delaware, either as controlling or
persuasive authority. The answer to this question, in turn, feeds into
the litigants’ potential obligation to disclose Trulia to the court in the
alternative forum. Both of these questions are analyzed below.
A.

The Extraterritoriality of Trulia

Whether Trulia applies to settlements outside of Delaware depends
first upon whether the target company is incorporated in Delaware. If
so, Delaware law is controlling authority for substantive issues, but the
law of the forum controls for procedural issues.30 But is Trulia
substantive or procedural?

27.

The substantive law of the state of incorporation will govern wherever the
dispute is litigated (except insofar as federal securities claims are raised,
to which substantive federal law applies). See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 645 (1982) (noting that state law governs “matters peculiar to
the relationships among or between the corporation and its current
officers, directors and shareholders”). The relevant federal venue would
be a district court in either the state of incorporation or the headquarters
state. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2011).

28.

See generally John Armour et al., Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 Ind. L.
J. 1345 (2012) (noting increase in post-Trulia merger claim filings outside
of Delaware); John Armour et al., Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J.
Empirical Legal Stud. 605 (2012) (same); Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra
D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger Litigation, 66 Vand. L.
Rev. 1053 (2013) (same).

29.

Cain et al., supra note 12, at 621 tbl.1 (2018) (finding merger filings in
other states jumped in the first year after Trulia only to be overtaken the
following year by filings in federal court).

30.

Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. Ill. L.
Rev. 467, 494 (2014).
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When Delaware companies settle merger litigation in other states,
the rules governing the approval of settlements are procedural and,
therefore, subject to the law of the forum.31 But, in the class action
context at least, the applicable standard is consistent across
jurisdictions.32 The court, as a fiduciary of the class, asks whether the
settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”33 Courts may consider
an array of factors in this analysis, but a crucial factor in all such
analyses is the value received by the plaintiff class in the settlement.34
In the context of a disclosure settlement, that means courts must weigh
the value of the disclosures.35 That much is procedural.36
But what standard applies in analyzing the value of the disclosures?
Delaware provides a substantive answer to this question, and that
answer under Trulia is “plainly material.”37 Some courts have therefore
followed the internal affairs doctrine in applying Delaware’s “plainly
material” standard to disclosure settlements in spite of an alternative
standard (such as “useful” or “helpful”) under the law of the forum.38
Courts do not always see it this way, however, and in other cases have
insisted upon their own substantive law in determining the value of
supplemental disclosures, notwithstanding Trulia.39
Alternatively, if the company is not incorporated in Delaware (or
if the standard for approving settlement is deemed to be procedural),
Trulia may still apply as persuasive authority. In such settings, Trulia
constitutes important persuasive authority because no jurisdiction sees
31.

Id.

32.

See Rubenstein, supra note 20, at 1468 & n.155.

33.

4 Alba Conte & Herbert Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions §
11:41 (4th ed. 2002). Most state rules in this context—like Delaware Court
of Chancery Rule 23—mirror Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). See,
e.g., Elizabeth Cosenza, The Persistent Problem of Multi-Forum Shareholder
Litigation: A Proposed Statutory Response to Reshuffle the Deck, 10 Va. L.
& Bus. Rev. 413, 429 (2016).

34.

See Conte & Newberg, supra note 33.

35.

In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898 n.46 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 22, 2016).

36.

Id. at 898 & n.45.

37.

Id. at 898.

38.

See Order & Statement of Reasons at 6, Vergiev v. Aguero, UNN-L-227615 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 6, 2016) (rejecting settlement and
adopting Trulia into New Jersey law). I was the shareholder objector in
Vergiev.

39.

Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 148 A.D.3d 146, 156 (N.Y. App. Div.
2017) (applying New York law to evaluate the settlement involving a
Delaware corporation sued in New York court, refusing to apply Trulia,
and ultimately arriving at a significantly more deferential standard than
Delaware). I was an expert for the objector in Gordon.

936

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 4·2019
Innovation in Disclosure-Based Shareholder Suits

as much corporate law litigation as Delaware. As a result, state courts
have adopted Trulia into their law in spite of the fact that the
underlying litigation did not involve a Delaware company.40
B.

The Obligation to Disclose Trulia as Precedent in Disclosure-Based
Settlements

A gating issue for all of these analyses is whether the court in the
settlement forum is aware of Trulia at all. Like a tree falling silently in
the woods, Trulia cannot inform the decision of a court that has not
been made aware of it. And there are plenty of reasons to suppose that
courts are left unaware.
Courts are unlikely to come upon knowledge of Trulia on their own.
It would be surprising if busy state court judges whose dockets do not
principally consist of corporate law cases kept close tabs on
developments in the Delaware Court of Chancery. Instead, courts in
other states rely on the adversarial system and, thus, the briefing of the
parties before them for information concerning the relevant legal
standards.
At settlement, however, there is no adversarial process. The
litigants have joined hands to defend their settlement agreement and
have no interest in subjecting it to serious judicial scrutiny.41 As a
result, neither side has any incentive to raise Trulia to the judge, either
in the briefing or in the settlement hearing itself.42
Even if the settlement proponents have no interest in raising Trulia,
they may have an obligation to do so. The rules of professional conduct
may obligate counsel under some circumstances to disclose authority
contrary to their position even if that authority is not raised by
opposing counsel. For example, ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) states that
“[a] lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal
authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be
directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by
opposing counsel . . . .”43 Trulia, in its open hostility to disclosure
settlements and in its announcement of a “plainly material” standard
40.

See, e.g., Bushansky v. All. Fiber Optics Prods., Inc., No. 16-CV-294245,
slip op. at 7–9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 29, 2017) (adopting Trulia standard
into California law); Griffith v. Quality Distrib., Inc., No. 2D17-3160, slip
op. at 13–14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. July 13, 2018) (adopting Trulia standard
into Florida law). I was the shareholder objector in Quality.

41.

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.

42.

See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Response to Objection by Lawrence B. Dvores to
Plaintiff’s Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, Stein v. Symetra
Fin. Corp., No. 15-2-20458-1SEA at 3 n.1 (Wash. Super. Ct. May 10,
2016) (citing Delaware authority for approval of disclosure-based fees and
discussing the benefits of settlement without mentioning Trulia).

43.

Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(2) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2018).
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for supplemental disclosures, would seem to be adverse to the position
of both proponents to a disclosure settlement. And, following the logic
above, if Delaware law controls with regard to the materiality
determination, Trulia should count as “authority in the controlling
jurisdiction.”44 Thus, at least when the settlement involves a Delawareincorporated company, Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) might impose an ethical
obligation to disclose Trulia to the court.
It is more difficult to read Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) to compel disclosure
when Trulia is persuasive, but not controlling, authority. However, in
such cases, the ethics rules may compel disclosure by another route.
After Trulia, plaintiffs often cited pre-2016 Delaware precedent
approving disclosure settlements as support for disclosure-based
settlements or fees sought in other jurisdictions, while nevertheless
remaining conspicuously silent on Trulia.45 This is a plainly material
omission. Citing Delaware precedent in favor of settlement without
citing Trulia is akin to perpetuating fraud upon the court. Under Model
Rule 3.3(a)(1), any party making a false statement to a tribunal has a
duty to correct it.46 A statement to the effect that “Delaware law
supports disclosure-based settlements like this one” may thus trigger a
duty to correct. The ethics rules thus prevent settlement proponents
from cherry-picking older Delaware case law supporting broad releases
and large fees without also informing the court of Delaware’s more
recent rulings, most notably Trulia.
In sum, the disclosure bar could not necessarily avoid Trulia by
taking their settlements to another state. As long as their fees depend
upon a class settlement, they necessarily face a fairness hearing. This
puts them in the position of being compelled to disclose Trulia to other
courts, which might decide to follow it. This left them vulnerable to
shareholder objections to settlement.47 These constraints led to further
innovation. First, to avoid the risk of settlement hearings, the disclosure
bar converted their disclosure settlements into mootness fee awards.
Second, to avoid Trulia, the disclosure bar changed the legal basis of
their disclosure claims from Delaware law to section 14A of the federal
proxy rules. Each of these innovations is discussed below.48
44.

Id.

45.

Anthony Rickey & Keola R. Whittaker, Will Trulia Drive “Merger Tax”
Suits out of Delaware?, Wash. Legal Found. (Apr. 29, 2016), https://
www.wlf.org/2016/04/29/publishing/will-trulia-drive-merger-tax-suits-outof-delaware/ [https://perma.cc/MW9K-SZ9F] (compiling cases in which
plaintiffs in alternative jurisdictions failed to cite recent Delaware case
law viewing disclosure-based settlements with disfavor).

46.

Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.3(a)(1) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2018).

47.

See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith & Anthony A. Rickey, Objections to Disclosure
Settlements: A “How To” Guide, 70 Okla. L. Rev. 281, 302 (2017).

48.

See infra Parts III & IV.
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III. Product Innovation: Mootness Settlements
As an alternative to settlement, a plaintiff with a disclosure-based
claim can simply insist that the defendant make additional disclosures
and, when they do, claim victory and fees on that basis.49 In this
situation, there is no fairness hearing because there is no settlement.
Instead, the plaintiffs’ lawyers voluntarily dismiss their claim as moot
on account of the defendant’s corrective disclosures, but not without
asserting a right to fees based on the benefit they created by bringing
the disclosures to the defendant’s attention.50 The right to fees can be
fought over by the parties and, if the plaintiff is successful, awarded by
the court, i.e. a “mootness award.”51 Often, however, they are simply
agreed upon by the parties, i.e. a “mootness settlement.”52
The mootness innovation enables the settlement proponents to
avoid the risk of a fairness hearing. Without a class settlement, there is
no release of claims, and no res judicata effect on non-party
shareholders who would otherwise be members of the class.53 Thus,
49.

Griffith & Rickey, supra note 47, at 290.

50.

Griffith & Rickey, supra note 47, at 284. Mootness fee cases are an
offshoot of the basic corporate benefit doctrine. As explained by the
Delaware Supreme Court:
Under the “mootness” exception, a court may award attorneys’
fees where the fee applicant demonstrates that: (1) the litigation
was meritorious when filed, (2) the action rendering the litigation
moot produced the same or a similar benefit sought by the
litigation, and (3) there was a causal relationship between the
litigation and the action taken producing the benefit.
Dover Historical Soc’y, Inc. v. City of Dover Planning Comm’n, 902 A.2d
1084, 1092 (Del. 2006) (accepting the further characterization of “the
mootness doctrine [as] an extension of the corporate benefit exception”).

51.

See, e.g., In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S’holder Litig., 756 A.2d
353, 357 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1999) (noting that “uncertainty over the
nature of the ‘benefit’ and its relation to the litigation may be expected
to occur primarily in moot cases. Where a case has been litigated to a
conclusion or settled, the nature of the ‘benefit’ and its causal connection
to the litigation is ordinarily clear”). The mootness award was cited by
the Court of Chancery as the “preferred method” for resolving disclosurebased claims because of the potential for adversarial fee litigation to
enable the court to value the benefit on an informed basis. In re Trulia,
Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 896–97 (Del. Ch. Jan. 22, 2016).
Unfortunately, parties have tended to settle in order to avoid this
additional layer of adversarial process. See Cain et al., supra note 12, at
629, 633 (finding sharply increasing rates of mootness settlements in the
wake of Trulia).

52.

See Cain et al., supra note 12, at 629, 633.

53.

See, e.g., In re Advanced Mammography Servs., Inc. S’holders Litig., No.
14831, 1996 WL 633409, at *1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 1996) (denying res
judicata effect to mootness dismissals because “to release claims that have
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insofar as the principal policy concern behind the curtailment of
disclosure settlements was the potential waiver of valid claims,
mootness fees raise no such concerns.54 But any hope that a move
toward mootness fees would result in the reinsertion of the adversarial
element through the contestation of fees has so far not been realized.55
After a small number of fee proceedings in the wake of Trulia, the
pattern seems to have moved towards mootness settlements rather than
mootness awards.56 At most, mootness settlements require shareholder
notification, not judicial review.57
How much do plaintiffs’ lawyers get for mootness fees? Early cases
in Delaware suggested mootness cases might be worth considerably less
than disclosure settlements.58 However, studies suggest that mootness
never been advanced, that in some instances may belong to other entities
that comprise the class (derivative claims), in which there appears to be
no serious discovery record in any event, and most importantly, in
exchange for no consideration”).
54.

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

55.

This hope was expressed in Trulia itself. The court noted that:
[In the mootness context,] where securing a release is not at issue,
defendants are incentivized to oppose fee requests they view as
excessive. Hence, the adversarial process would remain in place
and assist the Court in its evaluation of the nature of the benefit
conferred (i.e., the value of the supplemental disclosures) for
purposes of determining the reasonableness of the requested fee.
In re Trulia, 129 A.3d at 897 (citations omitted).

56.

See infra note 57. Mootness fees have also often been sought in
jurisdictions other than Delaware, thereby avoiding the additional
procedural protections provided by Delaware law. Id.

57.

See, e.g., Swomley v. Schlecht, No. 9355-VCL, 2015 WL 1186126, at *1–
2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 12, 2015) (setting forth a class notice procedure for
mootness fees, after defendants mooted certain disclosure claims and
successfully moved to dismiss rest of case); In re Zalicus, Inc. Stockholders
Litig., No. 9602-CB, 2015 WL 226109, at *1–2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 16, 2015)
(supporting a private mootness fee resolution procedure while requiring
that adequate notice be provided to stockholders); In re Astex Pharm.,
Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 8917-VCL, 2014 WL 4180342, at *1–2 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 25, 2014) (same).

58.

See, e.g., In re Xoom Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 WL
4146425, at *3, 5 (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016) (finding disclosures in mootness
in a mootness settlement to be merely “helpful,” not “material,” but
nevertheless awarding $50,000 in attorneys’ fees); see also Stipulated
Order Regarding Court-Ordered Notice and Closing the Action at 1, In
re PMFG Stockholder Litig., No. 11223-VCS (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017)
(mootness settlement for $75,000 in attorneys’ fees following plaintiff’s
notice of intent to object to disclosure settlement); Order Granting
Plaintiffs’ Petition for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees and Expenses at 3, In
re Baker Hughes Inc. Stockholders Litig. Consol., No. 10390-CB (Del. Ch.
June 17, 2016) (mootness award of $100,000 in attorneys’ fees in merger
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settlements have generally risen into the low- to mid- six figures, not
far from the going rate for disclosure settlements.59 Consistent with
these studies, data uncovered in response to a sua sponte request from
the bench in a recent federal case shows that mootness fees agreed upon
in federal district court and in Delaware Court of Chancery cases
between January 2016 and September 2018 range from $87,500 to
$450,000, with an average of $268,750.60
It is notable that plaintiffs’ attorneys are achieving these fees
without a release to shareholders not named in the compliant. In other
words, other shareholders could bring suit for essentially the same cause
of action in the underlying complaint. How likely is this? Not very.
First, with respect to claims alleging deficiencies of process and price,
the substantive law renders damages claims essentially unwinnable once
shareholders have voted to approve the transaction.61 Second, once the
vote occurs and the transaction closes, there is no longer any potential
for injunctive relief either.62 As a practical matter, this is why litigants
settle mootness claims close in time to the closing of the merger. By
doing so, they prevent other shareholder plaintiffs from filing similar
disclosure-based claims. Third, the best opportunity to identify
deficiencies of disclosure also passes with the shareholder vote.63 After
the vote, it will no longer be possible to settle for supplemental
disclosures, or other forms of non-monetary relief.64 Instead, claimants
will be forced to sue for damages claiming that materially deficient
disclosures caused the approval of a transaction that should never have
occurred.65 Although such claims may exist, they will be vanishingly

case); Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Application for an Award of Attorneys’
Fees and Expenses at 1, In re Receptos, Inc. Stockholder Litig. Consol.,
No. 11316-CB (Del. Ch. July 27, 2016) (mootness award of $100,000 in
attorneys’ fees in merger case).
59.

Cain et al., supra note 12, at 625 tbl.3 (finding median of $265,000 for
mootness settlements compared to median of $300,000 for disclosure
settlements in 2017); see also Anthony Rickey, Absent Reform, Little
Relief in Sight from Chronic “Merger Tax” Class-Action Litigation, 32
Wash. Legal Found. 4 fig.1 (Aug. 25, 2017) (compiling post-Trulia
mootness fee cases).

60.

See Defendant’s Response to Order Ex. 1 at 4–9, Einhorn v. Kindred
Healthcare, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-00297-RGA (D. Del. Sept. 19, 2018).

61.

See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del. 2015);
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644–45 (Del. 2014).

62.

See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312.

63.

See Kahn, 88 A.3d at 644.

64.

See id.

65.

See Corwin, 125 A.3d at 312–14.
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rare.66 This suggests that the breadth of the release that came with
disclosure settlements may not have been such an important component
of settlement after all.67 But if this is so, it also suggests that the real
value of a merger claim, whether it ends in mootness or settlement, lies
in its hold-up value prior to the shareholder vote.
In sum, innovative lawyers found a way to make mootness
settlements an effective substitute for disclosures settlements. Defense
lawyers get nearly the same protection from concluding a mootness
settlement as they achieve in a disclosure settlement. And plaintiffs’
lawyers are well compensated either way.

IV. Process and Product Innovation Combined:
Federal Court Filings and the Alt-Disclosure Claim
Yet another option for avoiding Trulia, and the risk that courts in
other states might follow it, is to file the merger claim in federal court
instead. Claims that would otherwise be disclosure-based merger cases
in state court can also be brought within the subject matter jurisdiction
of the federal courts by pleading violations of section 14A of the federal
proxy rules. The 14A innovation led not only to a route around Trulia
but also, eventually, to a world of new claims that could be settled for
supplemental disclosures and fees.
A.

Merger Claims Under the Federal Securities Laws

If state corporate law is principally focused on shareholders and
managers, federal securities law is principally focused on investors and
issuers.68 Because of the substantial overlap between investors and
shareholders, on the one hand, and corporate issuers and boards of
directors, on the other, there is considerable overlap in coverage
between the two regimes. The securities laws give the federal
government power to regulate what might otherwise be viewed as core
corporate governance functions—functions previously governed solely
by state law. For example, in the merger context, the federal securities
laws now prescribe tender offer procedures and the form and content of

66.

See id. at 312. The Bank of America/Merrill Lynch proxy fraud case that
resulted in a $2.43 billion settlement is perhaps the best example. See
Peter J. Henning & Steven Davidoff Solomon, For Bank of America, More
Trouble from Merrill Lynch Merger, N.Y. Times DealBook (Sept. 28,
2012, 1:31 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/the-cost-ofputting-the-merrill-lynch-merger-behind-it/ [https://perma.cc/M2XZ-JX4N].

67.

See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.

68.

The two principal securities laws for our purposes here are the Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77mm (2012), and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012).
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disclosures provided in connection with shareholder voting.69 Rules
promulgated by the SEC regulate proxy disclosures.70 Most notably,
Rule 14a-9 proscribes the solicitation of proxies by means of a
materially false or misleading proxy statement.71 The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that investors have a private right of action to enforce
Rule 14a-9.72
In the merger context, Rule 14a-9 claims allege that the target
company did not fully and fairly disclose all material information in the
merger proxy—essentially the same allegations underlying state law
fiduciary duty claims.73 Additional state law claims, such as Revlon
claims alleging defects in the merger process or price,74 can be appended
to the 14a-9 claims and brought in federal court.75 Alternatively,
plaintiffs may simply file the 14a-9 claim and seek a disclosure or
mootness settlement in federal court.76 In either case, section 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 guarantees that the 14a-9 claim cannot
be removed to state court.77

69.

See Securities Exchange Act § 78n-1.

70.

Rule 14a-3, for example, specifies the information that must be furnished
to voting security holders by cross-referencing detailed disclosure forms.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a) (2018) (cross-referencing Schedule 14A and
Forms S-4 and F-4); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 Schedule 14A (2018)
(setting forth information required in proxy statement).

71.

The rule states that:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means
of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other
communication, written or oral, containing any statement which,
at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it
is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact,
or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to
make the statements therein not false or misleading or necessary
to correct any statement in any earlier communication with
respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or
subject matter which has become false or misleading.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (2018).

72.

J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 430–32 (1964).

73.

See id. at 431–32.

74.

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).

75.

See, e.g., Brown v. Brewer, No. CV 06-3731-GHK (SHx), 2010 WL
2472182 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2010).

76.

See Borak, 377 U.S. at 430–31.

77.

Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides that federal
courts “shall have exclusive jurisdiction” over “violations of [the Act] or
the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions
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Within a year of Trulia, state law merger claims had converted
almost entirely to federal law merger claims.78 There is good reason for
this. Both before and after Trulia, many federal courts had shown
themselves to be receptive to disclosure-based settlements.79 But, this
strategy does not always work. In In Re: Walgreen Co. Stockholder
Litigation,80 Judge Posner reversed a district court decision approving
a disclosure settlement in the Walgreen-Boots merger.81 In holding that
the settlement should have been rejected because the disclosures
provided no benefit to the plaintiff class, Judge Posner expressly
endorsed the Trulia opinion and the “plainly material” standard.82 He
concluded that the district court on remand should “give serious
consideration to either appointing new class counsel, or dismissing the
suit.”83 As a result, Trulia via Walgreen now applies in the Seventh
Circuit and, going forward, settlement proponents in that circuit have
an obligation under Rule 3.3(a)(2) to raise Trulia at the settlement
hearing.84
at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by [the Act] or the
rules and regulations thereunder.” 15 U.S.C. § 78aa(a) (2012).
78.

Stephan Boettrich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in
Securities Class Action Litigation: 2017 Full-Year Review 5–6
(25th ed. 2018); see also Cain et al., supra note 12, tbls.1 & 5 (showing
an increase in the percentage of cases filed in federal courts).

79.

Typical disclosure settlements recently approved by federal courts include
Taxman v. Covidien PLC, 1:14-cv-12949-LTS (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 2015),
ECF No. 78; Leitz v. Kraft Foods Group, Inc., 3:15-CV-262-HEH, 2016
WL 1043021 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2016); McGill v. Hake, 1:15-cv-00217TWP-DKL (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 2016), ECF No. 54; Li v. Bowers, 1:15-cv00373-LCB-LPA (M.D. N.C. Mar. 22, 2016), ECF No. 26; In re
Meadowbrook Ins. Grp., Inc., 5:15-cv-10057-JCO-MJH (E.D. Mich. Apr.
7, 2016). I was involved in Covidien as an expert for the objector but had
no role in the other cases.

80.

832 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2016).

81.

Id.

82.

Id. at 725.

83.

Id. at 726.

84.

Even when a jurisdiction adopts the Trulia standard, the non-adversarial
nature of the settlement process can lead to striking omissions. For
example, after Walgreen, one plaintiff filed papers in support of a
disclosure settlement with a single citation to the Seventh Circuit’s recent
decision, for the proposition that “the trial judge should ask whether the
[supplemental disclosures] would be likely to matter to a reasonable
investor.” Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final
Approval of Class Action Settlement, Class Certification, and Application
for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Expenses at 12, Bushansky v. Remy
Int’l, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 742 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (No. 1:15-cv-01385-TWPTAB) (emphasis added) (quoting Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 724). In spite of
being filed in a district court (Indiana) within the Seventh Circuit, there
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As a result of Walgreen, federal cases have now largely converted
to mootness settlements rather than disclosure settlements, mirroring
early patterns in state courts after Trulia.85 This is, of course, another
example of innovation. In response to Trulia at the state level, plaintiffs
brought their cases in federal court, and in response to Walgreen at the
federal level, plaintiffs converted them into mootness dismissals. The
most significant innovation, however, may prove to be the
transformation of merger claims into something else entirely.
B.

Alternative Disclosure Claims Under Federal Law

The federal proxy rules do not mandate disclosure concerning
mergers alone. The proxy rules require detailed disclosure of a number
of items, including the prior experience and compensation of directors
and officers,86 details of fees paid to the company’s independent public
accountants,87 and details concerning stock-based compensation plans.88
Any one of these areas presents a potential for disclosure-based
litigation under the federal proxy rules.
In another example of destructive innovation, 14A disclosure claims
have begun to mutate from merger cases into these other forms. For
example, one alternative disclosure-based claim under 14A alleges that
a proposed proxy statement violates the proxy rules by failing to
disclose details purportedly required by Item 10(a), such as the number
of persons in each class of participants in a stock incentive plan.89 The
complaint seeks an injunction to prevent the vote or, alternatively,
supplemental disclosures to prevent the vote from being uninformed.90
Defendants can fight the injunction or make the disclosures and pay a
fee to the plaintiffs’ lawyers. Such alternative disclosure claims have
proliferated in the post-Trulia environment as frequent-filer plaintiffs

was no mention of the “plainly material” standard or Trulia’s other
requirements, let alone Judge Posner’s striking description of disclosure
settlements as “no better than a racket” that “must end.” Walgreen, 832
F.3d at 724. I appeared as an objector to this settlement. Following
adversarial argument over the value of the disclosures, the district court
refused to approve the settlement. See Bushansky, 262 F. Supp. 3d at 754.
85.

See Cain et al., supra note 12, at 483 tbl.V.A.

86.

17 C.F.R. § 14a-101 (2018).

87.

Id.

88.

Id.

89.

See, e.g., Complaint at 4–6, Stein v. Gibraltar Indus., Inc., No. 1:18-cv01893-CBA-SMG (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018), ECF No. 80.

90.

Id. at 1 (seeking “an injunction to prevent a vote by its shareholders on
Management Proposal 3 in the 2018 Proxy Statement . . . . The grounds
for this injunction are Defendant’s failures to comply with the SEC’s
disclosure requirements for proxy statements”).
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shift their targets from mergers to a wider array of allegedly improper
proxy disclosures.
The settlement dynamics of these alt-disclosure cases closely
resemble merger claims. Plaintiffs file disclosure-based claims, which
defendants moot by making supplemental disclosures shortly before the
shareholder vote, after which the plaintiffs and defendants negotiate a
fee. As a result, defendants eliminate the threat of an injunction, thus
obtaining essentially the same benefit as a disclosure settlement, and
avoid the cost of litigating the size of the plaintiffs’ mootness fee.91
Plaintiffs’ lawyers get six-figure fees that may, on average, be somewhat
smaller than their fees in disclosure settlements. On a per-hour basis,
however, their recoveries may be just as good.92 And the discovery of
new sources of disclosure-based claims may enable the disclosure bar to
maintain overall revenue levels, in spite of accepting slightly lower fees
on a per-claim basis. At the end of the day, however, the extent to
which the disclosure bar profits from such cases is difficult to measure
because the notices of dismissal often do not disclose whether fees have
been paid and, if so, in what amount.93
The common elements uniting proxy and merger claims are the
ability to settle for disclosures and the hold-up value of enjoining the
vote. The risk that the vote might be enjoined is enough to justify
making the requested disclosures, even if they are very likely
immaterial. And, once the disclosures have been made, the cost of
disputing fees in adversarial proceedings may be greater than simply
agreeing to a mootness settlement.94 The basic business strategy of the
disclosure bar, in other words, is the monetization of two hold-up
problems: the hold-up value of potentially enjoining the vote and the
91.

This is roughly the same benefit as a disclosure settlement because the
passing of the vote, not the settlement itself, eliminates the threat of
injunction. Because there is no preclusive settlement, the defendant
remains exposed to a very low probability of threat of a subsequent
damages claim for fraud in the proxy, as in the Bank of America/Merrill
Lynch merger. See Henning & Solomon, supra note 66. But such cases are
unicorns. Were a case as strong as the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch
proxy fraud case to present itself after a disclosure settlement, it is by no
means clear that the judge in the subsequent case would view herself as
precluded by the prior settlement. See supra notes 66–67 and
accompanying text.

92.

See, e.g., Stein v. Acuity Brands, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-06945-NGG-RER, at
2 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 12, 2018), ECF No. 15 (requesting a $300,000 mootness
fee for 7.7 hours of work); Stein v. Rusnack, No. 1:16-cv-02487-KPF
(S.D.N.Y Feb. 28, 2017), ECF No. 35 (receiving a fee award of $560,000
based on a lodestar of less than half that amount).

93.

See, e.g., Notice of Voluntary Dismissal, Gibraltar Indus., Inc., No. 1:18cv-01893-CBA-SMG.

94.

See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
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hold-up cost of fighting over the fee. Once the disclosure bar found their
way into federal court under federal law, they innovated new ways to
extract hold-up value using the proxy rules.

V. Competitive Innovation
But what about the defendants? So far, this Article has emphasized
the relentless creativity of the disclosure bar. But what about the other
side? How have corporate defendants adapted, responded, and
innovated themselves? What can corporate defendants do to respond
to the migration of disclosure-based litigation and the mutation of
disclosure-based claims into new causes of action?
It is worth observing, as an initial matter, that insofar as disclosurebased claims have proliferated as securities class actions, something
already has been done about it. In 1995, Congress enacted the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”),95 which, among other
things, bars fee awards for non-pecuniary relief in securities class
actions.96 The PSLRA expressly provides that: “[t]otal attorney fees and
expenses awarded by the court to counsel for the plaintiff class” in
securities class actions may “not exceed a reasonable percentage of the
amount of any damages and prejudgment interest actually paid to the
class.”97 Because no damages or prejudgment interest are paid to the
class in a disclosure-based settlement, attorneys’ fees in such
settlements must also be zero. Although some courts have rejected this
interpretation of the statute, it is the only interpretation consistent
with the statutory text.98 An alternative interpretation—that Congress
intended only to limit attorneys’ fees to a reasonable percentage of
damages when damages are paid, not to ban fee awards for nonpecuniary relief—imports assumed meanings into otherwise
unambiguous statutory text and is, in any event, unsupported by
legislative history.99 Courts in other jurisdictions have read parallel

95.

Pub L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat 737.

96.

George Coppolo, OLR Research Report, 2002-R-0695 Private
Litigation Reform Act (2002).

97.

15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2018).

98.

Transcript of Settlement Conference at 48, Taxman v. Covidien P.L.C.,
No. 1:14-cv-12949-LTS (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 2015), ECF No. 80 (“[I]t is an
awful lot of weight to read on that one sentence, that Congress rewrote
the common benefit rule with respect to federal securities litigation in that
sort of backhanded way, rather than directly . . . . I don’t read the
language quite as powerfully as you do.”). I was an expert for the objector
in Covidien.

99.

See generally H.R. Rep No. 104-369 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (focusing on the
total amount of fees awarded, not how those fees were calculated).
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statutes to bar non-pecuniary relief in class action settlements.100
Unfortunately, notwithstanding the clarity of the statutory text, federal
courts have a history of disregarding the PSRLA.101
Even if it were correctly interpreted and consistently applied,
however, the PSLRA would not solve the problem of disclosure-based
shareholder suits. The PSLRA provision quoted above bans fees only
in connection with class action settlements. Mootness fees, now the
most common litigation pattern in federal court, are apparently
unaffected. Moreover, plaintiffs can evade other provisions of the
PSLRA by filing on an individual rather than a class basis. For
example, the PSLRA seeks to avoid the problem of “professional
plaintiffs” by preventing any person from acting as a lead plaintiff in
more than five securities class actions during a three-year period.102 But
again, because this and other procedural protections of the PSLRA
speak only to class actions, the protections can be avoided by filing on
an individual rather than a class basis.103 In spite of claiming rights held
by all shareholders and seeking relief that would benefit all
stockholders, plaintiffs file individual actions without seeking class
certification. This is another example of innovation from the plaintiffs’
disclosure bar. By careful pleading, they evade the PSLRA.
But rather than waiting for Congress or the courts to clarify the
PSRLA, corporate defendants may be able to adopt an innovative
solution of their own to address the proliferation of meritless disclosurebased litigation. As I have argued at length elsewhere, corporations can
solve these problems through private ordering by enacting no-pay
provisions.104
A no-pay provision would commit the corporation, ex ante, to a
policy of not paying attorneys’ fees and costs for a specified form of

100. See Kazman v. Frontier Oil Corp., 398 S.W.3d 377, 387 (Tex. App. 2013)
(interpreting a Texas statute to prohibit the payment of attorneys’ fees
in a disclosure settlement).
101. See generally M. Todd Henderson & William H.J. Hubbard, Judicial
Noncompliance with Mandatory Procedural Rules Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 J. Legal Stud. S87 (2015) (noting
judges’ general reluctance to impose sanctions for PSLRA violations).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(vi) (2018) (allowing more than five lead
plaintiff appointments only upon express approval of the court).
103. See § 78u-4(a)(1). Other procedural protections of the PSLRA require
plaintiffs to certify certain information regarding their shareholding at the
time a complaint is filed, see § 78u-4(a)(2)(A), and to disclose any
proposed settlement to other class members, § 78u-4(a)(7).
104. Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No-Pay Provisions
Can Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t in The
Corporate Contract in Changing Times: Is the Law Keeping Up?
(Steven D. Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, eds., 2019).
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representative litigation.105 Such provisions could be broad (banning
corporate payment of plaintiffs’ fees in shareholder litigation generally)
or narrow (banning corporate payment of plaintiffs’ fees only for
disclosure-based claims). In either case, no-pay provisions operate as an
agreement among shareholders to opt-out of a default term of corporate
law—the corporate benefit doctrine—that, although originally designed
to benefit shareholders, instead has come to harm them.106 Such
provisions operate essentially as a waiver of the right to recover
attorneys’ fees from the corporation. The provision is consistent with
both state and federal law.107
Why then would corporations not adopt no-pay provisions?108 It
may be that corporate defendants are less innovative than the

105. For an example of such a provision consider:
To the fullest extent permitted by law, in the event that any
Claiming Party initiates or asserts any Claim or joins, offers
substantial assistance to, or has a direct financial interest in any
Claim against any Corporation Parties, then, regardless whether
the Claiming Party is successful on its Claim in whole or in part,
(i) the Claiming Party shall bear its own Litigation Costs, and (ii)
the Claiming Party and the Claiming Party’s attorneys shall not
be entitled to recover any Litigation Costs or, in a derivative or
class action, to receive any fees or expenses as the result of the
creation of any common fund, or from a corporate benefit
purportedly conferred upon the corporation.
Bridgeline Digital, Inc., Amended and Restated By-laws (Form 10-Q, Ex.
3.2) 20 (Feb. 17, 2015).
106. See Griffith, supra note 9, at 40–41 (discussing the origin of the corporate
benefit doctrine).
107. No-pay provisions are unaffected by the Delaware General Corporation
Law’s prohibition of fee shifting in bylaw and charter provisions. The
statute bars efforts to “impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys’
fees or expenses of the corporation.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 102(f)
(2019). A no-pay provision does not impose liability on any stockholder
for the fees and expenses of the corporation; it merely forces the
stockholder to bear his or her own fees and costs. See id. § 109(b) (“The
bylaws may not contain any provision that would impose liability on a
stockholder for the attorneys’ fees or expenses of the corporation or any
other party in connection with an internal corporate claim . . . .”). With
regard to federal law, there is no reason to suppose that the corporate
benefit doctrine is an immutable rule. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
396 U.S. 375, 390–97 (1970) (awarding attorneys’ fees in a § 14(a) claim
resulting in non-pecuniary relief on the basis of the traditional “corporate
benefit” doctrine). A No-Fee provision essentially contracts for the
reading of the PSLRA advanced in this Article.
108. It is worth noting that some have. Anthony Rickey & Benjamin P.
Edwards, “No Pay” Bylaws May Threaten Shareholder Lawsuits, CLS
Blue Sky Blog (Mar. 27, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/
2017/03/27/no-pay-bylaws-may-threaten-shareholder-lawsuits/#_ftn6
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disclosure bar because the stakes are lower.109 Corporations, of course,
would like to reduce the cost of non-meritorious disclosure-based claims,
but, however wasteful such claims may be, they are a manageable cost
and do not threaten the existence of the firm. By contrast, if the
disclosure bar did not adapt to changes making disclosure claims harder
to bring, they would go extinct.110 Necessity, it is often said, is the
mother of invention, and this may go far in explaining the greater
inventiveness of the disclosure bar compared to the corporate defense
bar.
Also, innovative corporate governance provisions likely increase
litigation risk, at least among early adopters, and plaintiffs are
especially primed to challenge provisions, such as no-pay provisions,
that threaten to impact their livelihood. For example, plaintiffs
challenged forum-selection bylaws at over a dozen companies, most of
which repealed the bylaw rather than litigate the issue, before the
provisions were finally upheld by the Delaware Supreme Court in
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp.111 More recently,
plaintiffs have been rewarded for knocking down fee-shifting bylaws112
and federal forum-selection provisions.113 Early adopters of no-pay
provisions are likewise open to challenges and, similar to early adopters
of forum-selection provisions, likely to settle the cases by removing the
provision (and paying attorneys’ fees). This is a Catch-22. Corporations
can either incur significant litigation costs in order to prove the
enforceability of a term designed to spare them wasteful litigation costs
or they can settle for lower litigation costs but, also, eliminate the term.
Most, unsurprisingly, have decided not to adopt the provision in the

[https://perma.cc/4JE2-VXE2] (surveying EDGAR filings and finding
few instances of no-pay adoptions).
109. See Friedlander, supra note 8, at 885–89 (recounting the high monetary
risks associated with disclosure litigation).
110. At least they would cease to exist as the disclosure bar. It is possible, of
course, that they could shift to specialize in a wholly different type of
litigation.
111. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). For more of the backstory on those claims,
see Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate
Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 Del. J. Corp. L.
333, 346 n.61 (2012).
112. Solak v. Sarowitz, 153 A.3d 729 (Del. Ch. 2016).
113. Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg, No. 2017-0931-JTL, 2018 WL 6719718 (Del. Ch.
2018).
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first place.114 Corporations need a test case—a Moran v. Household Int’l,
Inc.,115 for no-pays—before they widely adopt the provision.116
All of this suggests that the transaction costs of change in this area
are not zero and are not symmetrical. The corporate benefit rule
imposes obstacles to opting out. It is, thus, a “sticky” default.117 Sticky
defaults can enshrine inefficient rules, and corporate law scholars have
argued that the best way to prevent this is to set corporate law default
rules in favor of shareholders.118 In this case, however, the default rule
would appear to be set in favor of the disclosure bar and the defense
lawyers that generate fees from them. Because attorneys’ fees are paid
with shareholders’ money, a pro-shareholder default rule would be a
clear statutory provision or judicial ruling that blessed the adoption of
no-pay provisions.

Conclusion
This Article has traced innovations in disclosure-based shareholder
litigation following the Delaware Court of Chancery’s opinion in Trulia.
It has found ample innovation on the plaintiffs’ side, starting with the
migration of merger cases to other courts and their eventual mutation
into other kinds of disclosure claims, first designed to avoid Trulia, then
redesigned to evade Walgreen and the PSLRA. There has not been a
parallel amount of innovation on the defense side. The best way to spur
114. See Rickey & Edwards, supra note 108; Kevin M. LaCroix, More About
Litigation Reform Bylaws: Will “No-Pay” Provisions Succeed Where
Forum Selection Bylaws Have Failed?, The D&O Diary (Jan. 22, 2017),
https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/01/articles/securities-laws/litigationreform-bylaws-will-no-pay-provisions-succeed-forum-selection-bylaws-failed/
[https://perma.cc/2SEU-47MV].
115. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). See generally David Ronald Ellin, The Poison
Pill Warrant—Apothecary and Antidote: Moran v. Household
International, Inc., 36 DePaul L. Rev. 413 (1987) (describing the
importance of the Moran court’s decision to uphold an anti-takeover
device as an exercise of business judgment).
116. See id. (holding that poison pills generally could not be challenged when
adopted); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts,
91 Colum. L. Rev. 1931, 1985 (1991) (describing Moran as the test case
for poison pills).
117. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness
of Default Rules, 33 Fla. St. L. Rev. 651 (2006); Brett H. McDonnell,
Sticky Defaults and Altering Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. Rev.
383 (2007) (discussing implications of sticky default rules for corporate
law theory).
118. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaults for
Corporate Law Evolution, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 489, 492 (2002)
(emphasizing difficulties associated with opting-out of pro-management
terms given management’s power to control the voting generally and
therefore advocating pro-shareholder default terms).
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defense side innovation is to allow shareholders to agree to an
arrangement ex ante that precludes the payment of attorneys’ fees for
disclosure suits ex post.
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